Phenomenal Character Of Experience Research Articles

Defining sensory representation

ABSTRACT In the paper, I argue that the notion of sensory representation that Pautz defines (via the Ramsey method) has incompatible features. The notion is defined in terms of its ability to explain both the phenomenal character of experience and its ability to give us cognitive access to perceptible properties, all while being existence-neutral. I argue that there is strong reason to conclude that no worldly relation could play all three roles simultaneously.

Selectionism and Diaphaneity

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds.

Квалиа-реализм и репрезентационализм

The article deals with the problem of naturalistic explanation of an essential feature of all conscious mental states – the phenomenal character. The conception of qualia realism can be considered as one of the options for a non-naturalistic explanation of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it is believed that the phenomenal character of experience can be explained in terms of representational content that are more acceptable to naturalism. As a rule, in these discussions, qualia are identified with the non-representational properties of experience – mental paint. The author analyzes in detail the relationship between the concepts of “qualia” and “mental paint” in the key work of G. Harman. It is shown that Harman’s argument against qualia realism fails. He defined qualia in terms of the mental paint conception, which contains consequences that replace the original thesis of qualia realism. To attack the foundations of qualia realism in a more relevant way, the author develops A. Kind’s idea of the epistemic dimension of qualia. Kind points out that since the philosophers arrived at the question of the existence of qualia by considering the plausibility of functionalism, they were so focused on metaphysical considerations that they forgot that this phenomenon is connected in the first epistemic dimension. On the basis of this, a new version of the argument from transparency of experience versus qualia realism was proposed. The argument demonstrates that the qualia realism fails the test of introspective analysis of perceptual experience. Qualia turn out to be theoretical objects that do not fulfill their prescribed explanatory function. This undermines the foundations of metaphysical arguments against the reductionist approach to consciousness, since they proceeded from the assumption of the existence of referents of the concept of “qualia”. The variant of the explanation of the phenomenal character of experience in terms of representationalism also faces internal problems. In this regard, the author offers the option of direct realism, since it is well compatible with the transparency thesis and is generally consistent with the naturalistic attitudes of the representationalism.

Introspection and Primacy of Perception: A Critical Reflection on Naïve Realism

A fundamental issue in philosophy of perception is to understand the nature of experience and the relation of the experience with objects or states of affairs that is experienced. A prominent philosophical issue here is posed by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences, which are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception for the experiencer. The philosophical views in this matter can be grouped into three major positions on the basis of the nature of the subjective experience and relation of the subjective experience with the object. These are the sense-data theories—which consider that the objects of perception are mental entities; the representative theories—according to which perception is a representation of the objects in the external world; and the naive realist theories—which proclaim that the external objects are constitutive of the very perceptual experience and not a representation of it. Naive realism claims it is the defence of common-sense notion regarding experience i.e. how experience seems to the experiencer upon introspective reflection on it. This position has a growing number of proponents in philosophy especially in the last two decades. But it also entails radical departure of established philosophical views regarding the nature of experience, the phenomenal character of experience, and the experiencer–object relation. In this paper, we critically examine naive realism from two crucial aspects pertaining to it—the question of introspection being basis of naive realist thesis, and the notion of primacy of perception over non-veridical forms of experiences. We find that there are significant problems which weaken the naive realist thesis.

Reflexionism: A New Metaphysical View of Both the Content and the Phenomenal Character of Experience

Reflexionism: A New Metaphysical View of Both the Content and the Phenomenal Character of Experience

On the generality of experience: a reply to French and Gomes

According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta (J Philos 111:311–331, 2014) criticizes this view, and French and Gomes (Philos Stud 173(2):451–460, 2016) have attempted to show that phenomenal particularists have the resources to respond to Mehta’s criticisms. We argue that French and Gomes have failed to appreciate the force of Mehta’s original arguments. When properly interpreted, Mehta’s arguments provide a strong case in favor of phenomenal generalism, the view that external particulars are never part of phenomenal character.

Representationalism and Perceptual Organization

Some philosophers have suggested that certain shifts in perceptual organization are counterexamples to representationalism about phenomenal character. Representationalism about phenomenal character is, roughly, the view that there can be no difference in the phenomenal character of experience without a difference in the representational content of experience. In this paper, I examine three of these alleged counterexamples: the dot array (Peacocke 1983), the intersecting lines (Speaks 2010), and the 3 x 3 grid (Nickel 2007). I identify the two features of their phenomenology that call for explanation: grouping and prominence . I then argue that representationalists can adequately account for both of these features. I also critique some previous treatments of grouping and prominence.

Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse?

I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.

Methodological considerations for the neurophenomenology of dreaming: commentary on Windt's "Reporting dream experience".

Windt (2013) eloquently and compellingly presents an anti-skeptical approach to the use of subjective dream reports in empirical research (the “transparency view”). On this view, dream reports are “trustworthy sources of evidence about the occurrence and phenomenal character of experience during sleep, at least when gathered under ideal reporting conditions.” Her paper is an example of the changing tides in the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness, and is a welcome valorization of the utility of subjective reports. The long-standing distrust of verbal reports of private mental processes is gradually giving way to realization of the necessity for incorporating first-person reports into objective, third-person paradigms in mutually informing ways (Varela and Shear, 1999)—a methodology often embraced by the term “neurophenomenology” (Lutz and Thompson, 2003). But what are “ideal reporting conditions?” Taking Windt's “transparency view” as a starting point, we discuss a number of methodological considerations for neurophenomenological research on dreaming. We agree with Windt that it is crucial for empirical dream research to establish the extent to which dream reports are “transparent” accounts of subjective experiences; indeed, such transparency is the sine qua non for conducting meaningful qualitative and quantitative research on dream content. However, whereas dream experiences may be disclosed to the dreamer—or at least appear in the dreamer's memory—in a transparent way, important individual differences exist in introspective skills and in ability to articulate the breadth or depth of experience accurately in verbal or written form (Fleming et al., 2010; Sze et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2012). We may need to ask then, on both practical and epistemological levels, whether we wish to uncover what is “typical” in dreams of a certain socio-cultural population (the “breadth” of dreaming), or what is “possible” in the dream state (the “depth” of dreaming). In light of this distinction, the “ideal conditions” for reporting dreams may well be different depending on whether the purpose of a study is to assess breadth or depth of dream experience. Accordingly, and to further integrate dream studies within the nascent neurophenomenological framework, we outline two methodological elements that support more reliable elicitation, collection and analysis of dream reports: (1) specific and rigorous laboratory conditions for dream collection; and (2) introspective training and/or solicitation of “expert” participants.

Affect: representationalists’ headache

Representationalism is the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is identical to their representational content of a certain sort. This view requires a strong transparency condition on phenomenally conscious experiences. We argue that affective qualities such as experienced pleasantness or unpleasantness are counter-examples to the transparency thesis and thus to the sort of representationalism that implies it.

Speaks on strong property representationalism

Strong property representationalism, as applied to visual experience, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is one and the same as the property complex or �sensible profile� represented by that experience. Speaks discusses the following argument against this thesis: Let �RED� stand for the phenomenal character of the experience of red. �(1) Red = RED (strong property representationalism). �(2) My pen has no representational properties, but is red. Hence, �(3) My pen has a phenomenal character but no representational properties. Since (3) is false, (1) is false too. (3) Follows from (1) and (2) only on the assumption that what it is for something to have a phenomenal character is for it to instantiate a certain property just as what it is for my pen to have the color red is for it to instantiate the property of being red. The property instantiation model of having a phenomenal character is not the only possible model, however, and I reject it.

A Defense of McDowell’s Response to the Sceptic

Crispin Wright argues that John McDowell’s use of disjunctivism to respond to the sceptic misses the point of the sceptic’s argument, for disjunctivism is a thesis about the differing metaphysical natures of veridical and nonveridical experiences, whereas the sceptic’s point is that our beliefs are unjustified because veridical and nonveridical experiences can be phenomenally indistinguishable. In this paper, I argue that McDowell is responsive to the sceptic’s focus on phenomenology, for the point of McDowell’s response is that it is the phenomenal character of experience that makes the belief in disjunctivism rational, and thereby also makes rational the anti-sceptical belief that, other things being equal, the world is the way it appears.

Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, by Ned Block

Ned Block believes in mental paint. He is also inclined to believe in mental oil. That is, he believes that the phenomenal character of experiences, what it is like to have experiences, cannot be completely captured by functional or representational facts, or by facts about cognition. An experience involves ‘mental paint’ if it represents, but, like paint, has a nature that goes beyond what it represents. A plausible example: the phenomenal red in my visual experience represents the red colour of surfaces, but the quality of phenomenal red — what it is like to see red — cannot be reduced to its representing the red colour of surfaces. An experiences involves ‘mental oil’ if it does not represent. Perhaps orgasms are a form of mental oil: pure what it is likeness unheeded by the task of mirroring the world. Many of the essays in Block’s first volume of collected papers ‘Consciousness, Function and Representation’ argue in this direction, which gives his diverse work in philosophy of mind an overall unity and coherence. He argues in part using traditional thought experiments, offering us some of the most memorable and powerful thought experiments in philosophy. Perhaps most notably, Block gives us the pleasure of contemplating the Chinese nation collectively replicating the functioning of the human brain, the aim of which is to show the possibility of something functionally indiscernible from us but lacking phenomenal consciousness.

The Philosophical Significance of Attention

AbstractWhat is the philosophical significance of attention? The present article provides an overview of recent debates surrounding the connections between attention and other topics of philosophical interest. In particular, it discusses the interplay between attention and consciousness, attention and agency, and attention and reference. The article outlines the questions and contemporary positions concerning how attention shapes the phenomenal character of experience, whether it is necessary or sufficient for consciousness, and whether it plays a special role in the best philosophical theories of action or conceptual reference. Various interdependencies between the answers to these questions are indicated, as well as how these answers might depend on the metaphysics of attention. Together with its companion piece (‘The Nature of Attention') this article serves as an introduction to the philosophy of attention.

What does the ‘Transparency of Experience’ Show about the Relationship between the Phenomenality and the Intentionality of Experience?

A pretty big debate has been going on in the recent philosophy of mind as to whether the phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is exhausted by (or reduced to) its intentional content. On the one hand, Representationalists often argue on the ground of the so-called ‘transparency of experience’ that the phenomenal character of an experience is exhausted by its intentional content. On the other hand, qualia theorists object that there are non-intentional features of experiences (‘qualia’). But, in my view, the debate itself is wrong-headed in this respect: it presupposes that intentional contents of experiences can be explained without mentioning their phenomenal characters, but this presupposition is groundless. In this paper, I argue, by reconsidering the ‘transparency of experience’ thesis, that a more appropriate view on the relationship between intentional contents and phenomenal characters of experiences is a pretty much different one than that shared by both sides of the debate.

Reply to Leeds

My current view about perceptual experience has the following in common with the view in PC. It holds that we perceive colors by perceiving other what I call properties, that are not colors, and that it is possible for the phenomenal properties that are associated with particular colors in the experience of one person to be different from those associated with those same colors in the experience of another person, without either person misperceiving. The perception of tastes, smells, and other qualities is likewise held to involve the perception of phenomenal properties in a similar way. So the view is designed to allow the possibility of spectrum inversion, and other sorts of qualia inversion. But it is also intended to be a version of the view that the phenomenal character of experiences is an aspect of their representational content; the phenomenal character of an experience is a matter of what phenomenal properties it represents. Indeed, I claim that it is the view one must hold if one wants to combine a representationalist view of phenomenal character with the view that the experiences different subjects have when viewing the same colors (or other secondary qualities) in the same objective circumstances can differ in phenomenal character without any of the subjects misperceiving. A representationalist will hold that the phenomenal character of experiences is fixed by how things appear to the subject; and if the phenomenal character can vary independently of how things appear with respect to their objective properties (where colors count as objective), then on a representationalist view this can only be because the experience represents proper-

Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience

Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective 'feel'.' At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same as representational content that meets certain further conditions. One very important motivation for this theory is the so-called of experience. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the appeal to transparency more carefully than has been done hithertofore, to make some remarks about the introspective awareness of experience in light of this appeal, and to consider one problem case for transparency at some length, that of blurry vision. Along the way, I shall also address some of the remarks Stephen Leeds makes in his essay on transparency.

Synaesthesia and misrepresentation: A reply to Wager

Wager has argued that synaesthesia provides material for a counterexample to representational theories of the phenomenal character of experience. He gives a series of three cases based on synaesthesia; he requires the second and third cases to bolster the doubtfulness of the first. Here I further endorse the problematic nature of the first case and then show why the other two cases do not save his argument. I claim that whenever synaesthesia is a credible possibility its phenomenal character can be understood in terms of misrepresentation.

What Is It Like to See with Your Ears? The Representational Theory of Mind

Representational theories of mind cannot individuate the sense modalities in a principled manner. According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of experiences is determined by their contents. The usual objection is that inverted qualia are possible, so the phenomenal character of experiences may vary independently of their contents. But the objection is inconclusive. It raises difficult questions about the metaphysics of secondary qualities and it is difficult to see whether or not inverted qualia are possible. This paper proposes an alternative test of representationalism. Do experiences in different sense modalities have the same phenomenal character when they share content? Psychological work on the perception of shape through vision and spatial hearing is discussed. This work shows that visual and auditory experiences differ in phenomenal character even in so far as they represent similar properties. This objection to representationalism does not invite questions about secondary qualities or depend on establishing metaphysical possibilities.

Mental Paint and Mental Latex

The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind -maybe even all of philosophydivides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional. A convenient terminological handle on the dispute is whether there are qualia. Those who think that the phenomenal character of conscious experience goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive and the functional are said to believe in qualitative properties of conscious experience, or qualia for short. The debates about qualia have recently focused on the notion of representation, with issues about functionalism always in the background. All can agree that there are representational contents of thoughts, for example the representational content that virtue is its own reward. And friends of qualia can agree that experiences at least sometimes have representational content too, e.g. that something red and round occludes something blue and square. The recent focus of disagreement is on whether the phenomenal character of experience